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Government Purchase-of-services in China: Similar Intentions, Different Policy Designs 
SUMMARY 
China has adopted purchase-of-services to facilitate the development of societal sector, including 
social organisations, social work profession, and social services. Project-based and post-based 
purchases are two typical policy designs. Why do the local states develop two different designs 
to serve similar intentions? The answers to this question contribute to the broader discussion of 
policymaking and social development in China. With the intention-capacity analytic framework, 
this study systemically compares the Guangzhou’s project-based model and Shenzhen’s post-
based model, by drawing upon an extensive review of policy and archive documents, key 
informant interviews and field observations. The comparative study suggests, the pro-market 
ideology and incomplete analytical capacity in policy learning directed the design thinking 
towards market mechanism and purchase-of-services. Without the organisational conditions of 
social organisation and social work in Guangzhou, rapid growth in the social work workforce 
became the top priority in Shenzhen. Meanwhile, the trustworthiness of newly developing social 
organisations is another concern. All of these concerns underpinned the post-based design. Both 
models succeed in expanding the societal sectors with the substantial fiscal support. But the 
mixes of market and hierarchy tools, post-based model in particular, would be the obstacle in 
further enabling social organisation and social work profession.  
KEY WORDS—policy design; policy capacity; policy instrument; purchase-of-services; 
project- and post-based models; China  
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INTRODUCTION 
Social policy is crucial for human wellbeing, social development and state’s legitimacy. 
Meanwhile, it requires significant financial and manpower resources (Dean, 2012). Given this 
politico-economic significance, successful social policy must be carefully designed. Due to the 
changing landscape of social policy, such as gender roles, labour market and demographics, 
social services are increasingly at the centre of welfare state activities, and in some countries the 
expenditures for in-kind social services now exceed expenditures for in-cash transfers 
(Henriksen, Smith & Zimmer, 2012). Contracting out has become a signature initiative of 
welfare reform, as these countries attempt to modernize social service systems through 
decentralisation and marketisation. 
Various studies have investigated the effectiveness of contracting out social services in 
terms of cost containment and quality enhancement. Under most circumstances, the efforts of 
policymakers have failed. Inadequate capacity to design and monitor the procurement process is 
often blamed for the policy failure. However, while these studies highlight the importance of 
policy capacity for policy formulation and policy outcomes on one hand (Howlett, Mukherjee 
and Woo, 2015), they overlook government’s intentions to design contracting out on the other 
hand.  
The reason for this knowledge gap is that, originated from the welfare state crisis, 
contracting out for cost containment and quality enhancement has been taken for granted. The 
adoption of contracting out is thought to be shaped by the ideologies of decentralisation and 
marketization (Petersen, Houlberg and Christensen, 2015). It was typically seen less as ‘designed’ 
than as ‘emergent’ in an inevitable, quasi-automatic process involving the actions and interests of 
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the multiple public and private stakeholders active in complex modern societies and economies 
(Howlett, 2014).  
In emerging Asian economies, social policy is a particularly critical tool for state building 
and governance modernisation (Ringen et al., 2011; Wong, 2004). Contracting out has been 
transferred consciously to these emerging welfare states for unique politico-economic intentions 
beyond market creation (Wen and Chong, 2014). China’s fast-expanding social service system, 
achieved in the past decade through contracting out (in official terms, government purchase-of-
services), offers a unique opportunity to study policy design of this policy instrument in an 
emerging welfare state.  
In September 2013, the State Council General Office issued its “Guiding Opinions on 
Government Purchase-of-Services from Societal Actors”, which was followed by the “Interim 
Measures for the Administration of Government Purchase-of-Services” published by the 
Ministry of Finance in 2014. In December 2016, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs jointly announced the “Guiding Opinions on Supporting the Promotion and 
Development of Social Organisations through Government Purchase-of-services”. Contracting 
out has been formally legitimised as a national approach to societal development. The national 
approach of contracting out has many varieties of policy designs at the local level (Guan and Xia, 
2016). Post-based and project-based models are the two typical policy designs. Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou are leaders and representatives of these two designs (Law, 2009; Leung and Xu, 
2015; Liu and Han, 2013). In 2007 and 2009, respectively, Shenzhen and Guangzhou, two 
metropolises in Southern China, took the lead in launching government purchase-of-services 
programs. The two programs have similar overall policy objectives of “building a socialist 
harmonious society”, and use the same type of policy instruments of contracting out to social 
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organisations. But the mix of policy instruments and settings are very different. The post-based 
model in Shenzhen is purchase of social worker posts embedded in public institutions and 
entities, while Guangzhou’s purchase is mainly based on service projects and operated at the 
community level.  
Given the similarities in policy intentions and instrument type, why do Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou adopt different instrument settings? Given the collaboration with social organisations 
is a highly political decision in China, prior studies tend to explain the differences through the 
theoretical lens of transaction cost politics (Araral, 2014). Local officials may design institutional 
arrangements by taking local conditions, officials’ risk preferences, and risks of moral hazard as 
well as adverse selection into account. For instance, project-based model may generate higher 
regulatory costs because of the principal-agent problem, while post-based model could provide 
more control to local officials over the social organisations and social work professionalism 
(Chan, Yuen and Wong, 2013; Liu and Han, 2013). The transaction cost explanation for 
variations in policy design follows the conventional thinking that politics create policies.  
While the transaction cost approach partly explains the differences in policy designs at 
local level, it has not fully answered why local states are keen to “build a harmonious society” 
through contracting out, a significant instrument for dismantling traditional welfare state. Further 
investigation of these similarities in matching policy intentions and instruments is needed. 
Moreover, the national approach of contracting out has sparked debates about whether “spring” 
is coming for social organisations in China (China Daily, 17 April 2013). How do the similarities 
and differences in the policy designs affect the achievement of “building a harmonious society” 
in China? 
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The multi-level nature of the Chinese government increases the difficulty in matching 
policy instruments and goals in national planning with local implementation (Ngok, 2013). The 
similarities as well as differences in policy designs should not be simply put as local states’ 
proactive selection. The central government’s conscious intentions should be taken into account. 
Meanwhile, local governments at each level may hold different attitudes towards purchase-of-
services resulting in diverse policy outcomes. A case study of competitive contracting in 
Shanghai empirically reveals the reform was trapped in an intergovernmental game involving 
different levels of government and different governmental departments at the same level. The 
second-year program was even postponed for one year after the Bureau of Civil Affairs was 
incapable of meeting the Audit Bureau’s requirements on equity and performance (Jing, 2012; 
Jing and Chen 2012). The capacity deficit in inter-governmental communication and 
coordination erodes the policy success.  
Against this background, this article seeks to understand the similarities and differences in 
social policy designs and corresponding policy outcomes, through an analysis of policy 
intentions and capacity at the central and local levels. The study will compare the Guangzhou 
and Shenzhen cases by drawing upon an extensive review of policy and archive documents, key 
informant interviews with government officials, researchers and social services practitioners, and 
field observations since 2010.   
 
THEORISING POLICY DESIGN AND CAPACITY FOR CONTRACTING OUT 
The basic questions of policy design are: how do policy actors match goals and instruments, and 
how do their knowledge and capacity inform such choices (Linder and Peters, 1990)? Therefore, 
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the design intention (e.g. problem-solving or muddling through) and the capacity to carry it out, 
create different policy design scenarios and spaces (Dunn, 1997; Lindblom, 1990; Hasmath and 
Hsu, 2015; Howlett and Mukherjee, 2014; Howlett, Mukherjee and Woo, 2015; Mukherjee and 
Howlett, 2016). With respect to China case, the policy intents of the party-state at the central 
level and the policy capacity of local governments, are considered to be two determinant factors 
of the emerging welfare state (Ngok and Liu, 2016; Ringen and Ngok, 2013; Saich 2008).  
Over the past few decades, contracting out has been one of the flagship instruments to 
decrease the extent of central coordination and the significance of the state’s role in problem-
solving (Considine and Lewis, 1999). It provides market incentives for individuals and social 
organisations to follow government’s policy intentions (Hood, 1986). In the social policy sector, 
contracting out mainly involves the use of public financial resources to contract with social 
organisations for the production and delivery of social services (DeHoog and Salamon, 2002; 
Gilbert, 2002, 2005). The successful implementation of contracting out will transfer state in-
house production to government purchase-of-services, improve efficiency in the provision of 
social services, enable social organisations, and maintain the legitimacy of welfare state.  
When a range of non-state actors with diverse objectives engage in the policy design 
process, the matching of policy instruments with goals and capacity becomes increasingly 
dynamic and difficult (Froestad et al., 2015; Howlett and Ramesh, 2014; Lee and Thynne, 2011; 
Mukherjee and Howlett, 2016). Empirical studies suggest the policy failure in contracting out, 
due to inappropriate procurement and regulation strategies by incapable policymakers, is a 
common phenomenon (DeHoog, 1984; John and Ward, 2005; Van Slyke, 2002). The conclusion 
implies that capacity deficits are a challenge for the success of matching policy problems, 
instruments and settings.  
7 
 
This article adopts the definition of policy capacity as the set of skills, resources, and 
competences necessary to perform policy work (Painter and Pierre, 2005; Peters, 2015; Wu, 
Ramesh and Howlett, 2015). According to the nature of policy work, policy capacity can be 
categorized into three types: analytical, managerial and political. In addition, policy work is dealt 
with at three levels: individual, organisational and systemic (Mukherjee and Howlett, 2016; Wu, 
Ramesh and Howlett, 2015).  
These various skills, resources and competences of policy capacity have been partly 
explored by prior studies, such as: (a) organisational capacity to encourage potential social 
service providers to compete for government contracts; (b) managerial capacity to evaluate 
proposals and select vendors, and to negotiate, monitor and enforce contracts; and (c) political 
capacity to maintain strongly accountable partnerships with social service providers (Brown and 
Potoski, 2004; Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke, 2013; Cooper, 2003; Jing and Savas, 2009; Kettl, 
1993; Lamothe and Lamothe, 2009; Lamothe, 2015; Sclar, 2000).  
 
STAGE ONE: NATIONAL INTENTIONS: GOVERNMENT TRANSFORMATION AND 
SOCIETY BUILDING IN CHINA 
This section analyses the overall policy intentions of contracting out with emphasis on the match 
of problem and instrument. Before the economic reform in the late 1970s, China was a totalistic 
party-state in which everything fell under the socialist state’s rigid control (Guo, 2000; Tsou, 
1994). In this patriarchal welfare state, urban residents received social protection through their 
work units. Non-state service providers were extremely underdeveloped under the state’s strict 
restriction. The socialist welfare regime changed dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s in order to 
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accelerate economic growth, increase productivity and efficiency, and enhance the 
competitiveness of state-owned enterprises. The Chinese government carried out ‘socialisation of 
social welfare’ in the 1990s, in order to cope with the social service deficits and the financial 
burden resulting from the erosion of the socialist welfare regime in the late 1980s (Chan, Ngok 
and Phillips, 2008). Non-state service providers emerged under the government’s strict 
supervision. All of these changes reflect a pro-market ideology in social policy orientation (Gu, 
2001; Holliday, 2005; Wong and Flynn, 2001). However, the unilateral focus on economic 
growth has resulted in a serious imbalance between economic growth, environmental protection, 
and social equity. As a result, social tensions became widespread and social protests became 
frequent across the country in the mid-1990s. All of the social problems called for a new policy 
paradigm of development to strike a balance between economic growth and social development 
(Ngok, 2009).  
 
Match of intentions and instruments: social organisation and earmarked funds for harmonious 
society building 
The succession of a new generation of the party-state’s top leadership in 2002 opened a window 
for policy change. At the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2002, the 
then new political leadership pointed out the need to “perfect the government functions in 
economic adjustment, market monitoring, social management and public services”. This four-
dimensional scope of government function signalled the party-state’s political determination to 
transform the totalistic regime towards a “service-oriented government”, which was formally 
highlighted at the Second Plenum of the 17th Party Congress in 2008.  
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The government transformation in China calls for a clearer boundary and division of labour 
among state, society, and market. The new jargon of “social management” illustrates how the 
party-state’s attention has been partly reallocated from economic affairs to societal affairs. The 
outbreak of the public health crisis in 2003 accelerated a fundamental shift in the policy 
paradigm, including a conscious attempt to strike a balance between economic growth and social 
development (Leung and Xu, 2015; Wang, 2008). Later, at the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Party 
Congress in 2004, the party-state further elaborated its ideas as “strengthening society building 
and social management, and promoting the innovation of social management”. Two years later, 
at the Sixth Plenum, the party-state formally pledged to promote a “socialist harmonious society”.  
One of the key tasks is to develop a strong team of social workers, a profession which was 
non-existent in China’s socialist welfare regime between 1952 and 1982 (Mayadas, Watts and 
Elliott, 1997; Leung et al., 2012). Natural disasters (such as the Sichuan earthquakes of 2008 and 
2013) and mega events (such as the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics, 2010 Shanghai World 
Expo, and 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games) have further deepened the state’s understanding of 
social services, social workers and volunteers, and social organisations as organisers and 
coordinators behind these.  
As mentioned above, state in-house service production has long been the default welfare 
solution during the socialist era. The state now acknowledges the reciprocal relationship between 
government transformation and society building, and the importance of a vibrant societal sector. 
Thus, the broader policy intention of society building could be specific to the promotion of social 
organizations for organising social workers and volunteers to provide caring social services. In 
the societal development, social organisations and their social work employees will replace 
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public production by government bureaucracies. From the theoretical lens of policy instrument 
(Hood, 1986), this is a move from one type of organisation-based tool to another.  
At this moment, there are insufficient social organisations in China to provide social 
services, due to the rigid requirements on agency registration before this wave of social reform 
(Hildebrandt, 2011). Moreover, the staff of social organisations may not have the required 
expertise to deliver services: social work training and social services management have a very 
short history in China and experience is still being accumulated. Meanwhile, the Chinese 
government possesses very limited knowledge and experience of collaboration with social 
organisations in the social service area (Chan 2005). 
Against this background, while the central government established the national policy 
intentions of the development of social organizations, social services and social workers, it has 
not yet figured out the exact instrument mixes to achieve the goals at this stage. It only highlights 
that earmarked funds, a treasure-based policy instrument, would be put in place. Given the 
successful experience of market transition and decentralisation, the Chinese government at all 
levels widely believe that providing economic incentives through market mechanisms is the most 
efficient way to induce a target group’s desired action (Ngok and Wen, 2008). More importantly, 
with the increased fiscal capacity that has been generated from the booming economy in the past 
three decades, the Chinese government is capable of providing substantial fiscal support.  
The choice of actual instrument kits is decentralised to local governments and determined 
through policy learning and policy experiments. The central government’s action is more like a 
‘nondecision-making’ practice that limits the scope of actual decision-making to ‘safe’ issues 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1963). The local governments, in turn, attempt to collaborate with social 
organisations through learning-by-doing.   
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STAGE TWO: LOCAL EXPERIMENTS: PROMOTION OF SOCIAL ORGANISATION 
THROUGH PROJECT-BASED AND POST-BASED PURCHASES 
Given the substantial earmarked funds at hand, local governments have to make a fundamental 
choice between the several possible arrangements of resource allocation for social organisations, 
including providing direct subsidies, or creating markets in the form of contracting out and 
issuing vouchers. In fact, all of these arrangements have been applied in China (Wang and 
Salamon, 2010). For example, during the socialisation of social welfare in the 1990s and prior to 
the society building era, residential care for the elderly and the disabled was outsourced to the 
private sector in several municipalities, including Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuxi, and Ningbo 
(Chan, 2005; Jia and Su, 2009; Jing and Chen, 2012; Yang, Huang and Fulda, 2015). However, 
these practices were restricted to a small scale, and were not institutionalised: according to the 
Procurement Law promulgated in 2003, social services were not included in the scope of public 
procurement. 
Guangdong province, the pioneer of Chinese economic reform, has also been the pioneer 
of social reform. The central government has delegated the power and privilege of “early and 
pilot implementation” to Guangdong province to initiate policy experiments in innovating social 
management. Multiple modes of public service provision, including public production, public 
commission and government purchase, have been highlighted in the “Framework for 
Development and Reform Planning for Pearl River Delta Region (2008-2020)” in December 
2008. 
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The municipal authorities in Guangzhou and Shenzhen consciously conducted policy 
learning from neighbouring Hong Kong as well as Singapore, two semi-democratic city states 
with Chinese culture and a developed welfare system. Officials in both Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen were particularly impressed by Hong Kong’s approach of “NGOs producing publicly 
subsidised welfare services” (Jones, 1990). Both cities have conceptualised Hong Kong’s 
welfare subvention as “government purchase-of-services from social organisations”, or 
contracting out. As learning outcomes, Guangzhou formulated the “Opinions on Learning 
Advanced Experiences from Hong Kong to Promote Reform of Social Management” in 2009.  
Shenzhen took actions even earlier, in 2007, with its policy paper “Opinions Concerning 
the Establishment of Social Work Manpower Teams and the Promotion of Social Work 
Development”. This paper, also known as  the “1+7” policy paper for its main document and 
seven appendices, addressed the issues of fiscal support, social work education and qualifications, 
and staffing and salary. Shenzhen’s proactive initiatives have been featured as a learning model 
on the website of the Ministry of Civil Affairs.1  
Guangzhou (the capital city of Guangdong) and Shenzhen (China’s first special economic 
zone, established in 1980) are the two most prominent cities in the Southern China. Moreover, as 
the pioneers of China’s market reform with the most liberal public media and progressive civil 
society, Guangzhou and Shenzhen are the most capable municipal governments in China. While 
both of them take Hong Kong’s experience as a policy learning model, they became leaders and 
representatives of two different models of contracting out: project-based and post-based, 
respectively. These two typical settings were later adopted by many other municipalities. This 
                                                          
1 See Shenzhen social work “1+7” policy paper http://sw.mca.gov.cn/article/ztzl/szzt/  
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policy diffusion signifies Guangdong province as a pioneer not only for economic reform, but 
also for social reform. 
The following section will examine these two typical designs of purchase-of-services in 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen, with a focus on policy capacity. The case study of these two cities 
represents the achievements and problems of the policy designs.  
 
Project-based model in Guangzhou 
Under the project-based model, the object of government purchase is a specialised service or a 
service project/centre. The workflow is as follows: the government establishes a service 
project/centre, and invites social organisations to submit bids. An independent assessment panel 
is then commissioned by the government to review the proposals. The successful bidder is 
allocated the authority of operating the new service project for a fixed period, normally for three 
years. To run the service project, the successful bidder will recruit and employ social workers. 
The government and the third party reviewers commissioned by the government will conduct 
monitoring and evaluation on the service production process and outcomes.  
Guangzhou’s contracting out began with the purchase of specialised social services. As 
early as 2008, the Guangzhou municipal government enacted the “Measures on Home and 
Community Care for the Elderly”, requiring the purchase of care services from community 
service centres at street-level residential communities. These centres were not social 
organisations but public institutions that had been set up and fully funded by the Civil Affairs 
Bureaus and the grassroots government agencies since the 1990s. Most of the frontline staff at 
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the centres are laid-off workers of state-owned enterprises who lost job in their 40s and 50s and 
without sufficient care skills. 
In addition to these ill-equipped government-organised community service centres, 
professional social service organisations also emerged in the same year. To join a pilot scheme 
initiated by the Central Commission of the China Communist Youth League in September 2007, 
officials at municipal and district levels invited social work teachers at Guangzhou’s Sun Yat-sen 
University to launch a youth service project. The pilot programme, funded with two million yuan 
provided by the Haizhu district government, was commissioned to a newly established social 
organisation in February 2008 under the supervision of the district Communist Youth League 
(Law, 2013). Later, Liwan district also devoted one million yuan to launch family service pilot 
projects at eight street offices.  
The “purchase-of-services” model expanded after municipal officials visited Hong Kong 
and Singapore to learn social management practices in 2009. Most of the previously mentioned 
specialised services have now been integrated into a family service package. The municipal 
government decided that each street-level community must establish its own “integrated family 
service centre” operated by social organisations by 2012. The governments at the municipal and 
district levels allocate two million yuan annually to each centre, regardless of the number of 
service users.  
From 2008 to 2015, Guangzhou governments at various levels have devoted more than 1.3 
billion yuan for purchase-of-services. The achievements are significant: the number of social 
organisations in Guangzhou significantly increased from less than 10 in 2008 to 267 by January 
2015. These social organisations have provided 3,800 new jobs, 2,500 of which are social worker 
posts (Guangzhou Daily, 20 January 2015). As of August 2015, 176 integrated family service 
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centres account for more than 90 percent of total procurement funding. Apart from these 
integrated services, there are 20 specialised projects serving various service users in the 
communities (Guangzhou Community Service, 2015; Guangzhou Daily, 19 January 2015; New 
Express Daily, 2 September 2015).  
 
Post-based model in Shenzhen 
Different from Guangzhou, social work was almost non-existent in Shenzhen before government 
purchase-of-services (Leung and Xu, 2015). To respond to the central government’s call for 
social work development, the municipal government sought a ‘shortcut’ to build a great social 
work team in a short period through the direct state establishment of social work positions. ‘Post’ 
and ‘workforce’ are two key words in Shenzhen’s policy paper entitled “Opinions Concerning 
the Establishment of Social Work Manpower Teams and the Promotion of Social Work 
Development” and its 7 supplementary guidelines on financing, social work education and 
qualifications, staffing, and salary. 
Under the post-based model, the object of purchase is not the social services, but the social 
workers who produce the social services. To be specific, the Civil Affairs Bureau disseminates 
the importance of social work across the public sector. Then various public organisations, 
including policy bureaus like the Judicial Bureau and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs; public 
institutions, including hospitals and schools; and mass organisations including the Shenzhen 
Municipal Trade Union, Communist Youth League, and the Federation of Women, make 
recruitment plans to open social work posts within their entities. Upon the Finance Bureau’s 
approval of funding and new posts, the Civil Affairs Bureau conducts open tendering, and social 
organisations submit their proposals. Successful social organisations sign a three-year contract 
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with the Civil Affairs Bureau and the employing public entity. Finally, social workers are sent to 
hold the post within the employing public entities. For performance monitoring, the government 
commissions third-party reviewers to evaluate the performance of each social organisation as 
well.  
From 2007 to 2012, a total of 350 million yuan, mainly from the Welfare Lottery, was 
devoted to the purchase of social work posts in Shenzhen. The annual standard price of each post 
was 60,000 yuan in 2007, 66,000 yuan in 2009 and 70,000 yuan in 2010. As of 2015, the 
standard is 75,000 yuan, among the lowest salary for social workers in the Pearl River Delta. The 
purchasing standard in Shenzhen will be raised to 93,000 yuan later in 2016 (Ministry of Civil 
Affairs, 2016). Similar to Guangzhou, with the substantial fiscal support, Shenzhen expanded its 
number of social workers from 96 in 2007 to 6911 by May 2016. As of May 2016, there are 142 
social organisations providing social services in Shenzhen. Among these 142 social organisations, 
more than 70 agencies were undertaking 761 social work posts in public institutions (Shenzhen 
Civil Affairs Bureau, 2016; Shenzhen Social Workers Association, 2016).  
Under the post-based model, social workers are employed by the social organisations but 
work at the employing entities, including hospitals, schools, and criminal justice agencies (the 
secondary practice setting), rather than at the service centres of the social organisation employer 
(the primary practice setting). In contrast to the primary setting, social work in the secondary 
setting is only one part of the service production process. The role of social workers is to support 
the employing organisation’s primary function. Social workers confront many conflicting 
demands and expectations from non-social work professionals. Meanwhile, they are under a dual 
supervision system: the professional supervision of the social organisation and the administrative 
supervision of the employing organisation. As a result, social workers enact an extremely 
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complex and often vaguely defined professional identity (Cowles, 2003; Openshaw, 2008; 
Patterson, 2012). 
 
STAGE THREE: FROM LOCAL EXPERIMENTS TO NATIONAL POLICY 
Guangzhou and Shenzhen have adequate fiscal resources to promote the development of social 
organisations. Both the project-based and post-based contracting out approaches have 
successfully generated significant growth in the numbers of social organisations, social workers 
and social services in the past decade. In this sense, purchase-of-services is an appropriate match 
of societal development goals and tools of earmarked funds. Thus, the local experiments of 
purchase-of-services have been legitimised as an effective policy design in the early 2010s.  
For example, at the provincial level, the Guangdong provincial government enacted 
administrative guidelines for purchasing social services in 2012 to institualise and regulate the 
contracting out practices. At the national level, purchase-of-services was advanced as a national 
pathway to “service-oriented government” pledged in The 12th Five-Year Plan on Developing a 
Basic Public Service System in 2012. The General Office of the State Council published the 
“Guidance on Purchasing Services from Society” to provide principles and directions for further 
implementation by local governments in September 2013. Two months later, the political report 
of the Third Plenum of the 18th Party Congress formally proposed, for the first time, “to promote 
government purchase-of-services, and introduce competition mechanism”. The report also 
adopted the concept of “social governance” in place of the previous “social management”. The 
wording change implies the repositioning of the collaborative relationship between state, society 
and market in a modern system of state governance. Finally, purchase-of-services was officially 
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institutionalised when the Ministry of Finance issued “Interim Measures for the Administration 
of Government Purchase-of-services” in 2014.  
It is worth noting that none of these national policies attempt to make a choice between the 
two possible purchase-of-services designs. The only one exception is the fact that the post-based 
model has been highlighted as a possible approach to cope with graduate unemployment, which 
is another critical problem in China.  
 
COMPARISON OF INSTRUMENT SETTINGS, POLICY CAPACITY AND POLICY 
OUTCOMES 
Guangzhou’s project-based purchases and Shenzhen’s post-based purchases share the same 
policy objectives—namely, the development of vibrant social organizations, professional social 
work, and caring social services, but have different designs. Project-based purchase mainly 
focuses on the service production itself, while post-based purchase pays more attention to the 
development of the social work profession and the social work workforce.  
More importantly, the mix of policy instruments and settings are different. Guangzhou’s 
service projects/centres are operated at the community level as independent entities. The mix and 
setting of policy design are straightforward: under a mode of market governance, public funding 
(a treasure-based instrument) promotes the emergence of social organisations (an organisation-
based instrument). Then social organisations recruit their own social workers and supervisors, 
and operate service centres with relative autonomy.  
In Shenzhen, in contrast, newly emerging social work profession has to be incorporated 
into public institutions and entities of the traditional hierarchical system. Social organisations 
19 
 
themselves only have a limited role to play.2 This is a complicated mix and setting of policy 
design, with public funding and social organisation working within a governance hybrid of 
market and hierarchy.   
Local organisational conditions and government collaborative capacity could partly explain 
the differences in design. Guangzhou’s design is the product of a close collaboration between 
government officials, social organisations and scholars. As early as the late 1990s, some district 
governments and street offices in Guangzhou started to collaborated with Hong Kong NGOs to 
serve cross-border families. Guangzhou’s grassroots governments and street-level bureaucrats 
are not completely ignorant of social work profession and social organisation. Moreover, a 
majority of the province’s universities, with top scholars and facilities, are situated in Guangzhou, 
the capital city of Guangdong province. In the early 2000s, several universities in Guangzhou re-
launched the bachelor programme in social work education. This has laid the knowledge 
foundation for the adoption of the project-based model. When the municipal government’s 
policy intention emerged and connected to these foundations in the right circumstances by policy 
entrepreneurs such as university social work teachers in 2008, Guangzhou’s pilot scheme was 
established in a project-based form, following the typical mix of tools and settings in other 
established welfare states. 
Different from Guangzhou, Shenzhen is a newly developing city with a large number of 
new immigrants. Before the publication of the “1+7” paper in 2007, social work training and 
practice were almost non-existent in the city (Leung and Xu, 2015). Without Guangzhou’s 
knowledge and organisational foundations, Shenzhen developed the innovative post-based 
approach to promote the importance of social work and facilitate the development of a 
                                                          
2 The author would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggestion on this point. 
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professional identity within a short period. To address issues of incapacity, and to take advantage 
of Shenzhen’s geographical proximity to Hong Kong, Shenzhen also adopted a cross-border 
supervisory model by purchasing social work supervision services from Hong Kong’s NGOs 
(Chan, Ip and Lau, 2009). Hong Kong supervisors pay regular visits to supervise frontline social 
workers at their service units in Shenzhen. 
Apart from knowledge and organisational conditions, political capacity should not be 
overlooked. Guangzhou and Shenzhen both have the political privilege as sub-provincial level 
entries in China. Meanwhile, Shenzhen, as one of the five cities enjoying “Separate Line-Item 
Status” treatment in the National Socio-Economic Development Plan, also possesses provincial-
level economic power and pays no tax to Guangdong. The privileged political and economic 
status has intensified competition between Guangzhou and Shenzhen (Ng and Xu, 2014). With 
the post-based contracting out model, Shenzhen shines in the policy innovation of social 
management.  
Meanwhile, under the post-based model, social workers working within public entities are 
similar to the traditional state in-house production. Social workers’ activities as well as social 
organisations’ operations are under government control. The mixture of market and hierarchy 
provides less autonomy to social organisations but greater political and fiscal safety to 
government officials. Greater safety and less uncertainty are particularly important to the 
Shenzhen municipal government when it made the first purchase-of-services from social 
organisations in China. 
The designs and capacity in Guangzhou and Shenzhen also generate similar as well as 
different outcomes in addition to the increasing numbers. First of all, manpower shortages and 
high turnover rates have impeded the implementation and effectiveness of both project- and post-
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based purchases in Guangzhou and Shenzhen. As the Civil Affairs Bureau in Guangzhou 
indicates, among all frontline social workers in Guangzhou, only 1 percent has more than five 
years of experience, and 92.8 percent have less than three years of experience; the annual 
turnover rate is 24.3 percent (Guangzhou Daily, 20 January 2015). In the words of one observer, 
the situation is expected to be worse under a post-based model (China Philanthropy Times, 30 
April 2014). In fact, the turnover rate in Shenzhen significantly grew in the past seven years from 
8.2 percent in 2008 to 22.2 percent in 2014. The turnover rates in both cities have reached the 
unhealthy level of employee turnover rate at 20 percent. In Hong Kong, which served as the 
policy learning model for Guangzhou and Shenzhen, the turnover rate of social workers 
employed by social organisations was only 14.2 percent in 2014 (Joint Committee on Social 
Work Manpower Requirements, 2015). 
China’s determined national strategy to purchase social services and professional staff has 
boosted demand for well-trained social workers and experienced supervisors. However, the 
newly re-emerging social work education in Chinese higher education is inadequate to meet this 
booming demand. For example, 176 integrated family service centres in Guangzhou need about 
2,000 social workers at this moment, but less than 700 social work students graduate annually 
from Guangzhou’s 14 universities. In addition, more than half of these fresh social work 
graduates do not choose social work as a career (Zeng et al., 2016). This shows that the 
unsatisfactory working conditions and unclear future career opportunities, some of which are due 
to the policy designs of contracting out, make it difficult to attract and maintain a stable 
workforce. 
The unsatisfactory working conditions are twofold. Chinese social workers face 
institutional constraints that their counterparts in advanced welfare states do not. For example, 
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social workers may have to carry out administrative duties delegated by the government that may 
be totally in contrast with the professional ethics of social work. The problem is particularly 
critical for the post-based model, where social workers serve as dispatched employees of the 
employing entities. Frequently, the employing entities treat the post-based social workers as 
additional manpower, and require them to handle administrative tasks that are irrelevant to the 
social work profession. The bureaucratisation of the social work profession erodes the 
professional status and identity of Chinese social workers. 
Moreover, the wages and benefits under contracting out have caused quite a stir in public 
opinion. Though the Chinese government intends to support the development of the social work 
profession and social organisations, contracting out still functions as cost control method in the 
form of competitive bidding. Meanwhile, both government departments and social organisations 
lack sufficient information about the actual unit cost of various social services. This is why the 
Guangzhou municipal government provides a standardised sum of two million yuan to each 
integrated family service centre regardless of comunity size and service scope. In order to gain 
promotions and higher salaries, many experienced social workers in Guangzhou and Shenzhen 
move to the newly established agencies in the second- and third-tier neighbouring cities in 
Guangdong province, such as Foshan, Dongguan, and Huizhou.  
All of these problems suggest that the Chinese government has underestimated the issue of 
manpower when learning about and designing contracting out. In Hong Kong, there is an 
advisory committee responsible for reviewing and projecting social work manpower 
requirements. China is making some moves in this direction: Guangdong province published its 
first document on “Building the Social Work Workforce Team” in 2010, and the Ministry of Civil 
Affairs in 2012 enacted the national “Report on the Mid-to Long-Term Development of the Social 
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Work Workforce”. However, in these policy papers, the government still establishes target 
numbers of new social workers without a rational analysis of service development, and the 
demand and supply of manpower. This suggests that Chinese government has strong fiscal 
capacity to initiate contracting out social services, but lacks sufficient analytical and managerial 
capacity to use the public funds effectively and efficiently.  
Furthermore, the public accountability requirement urges Chinese government to develop 
analytical capacity for proposal assessment and performance review in purchase-of-services. As 
mentioned, many social organisations were set up by local social work teachers, retired 
government officials and those with close connections to civil affairs bureaus and street offices. 
Street-level bureaucrats, such as cadres at district governments and street offices, have a 
tendency to favour social organisations with strong government connections (Leung and Xu, 
2015). Neither the project-based nor post-based model is able to ensure transparent bidding and 
accountable selection of organisations. During field research, several informants in Guangzhou 
and Shenzhen indicated that open tendering at times was only a formality requirement, and the 
successful bidder had already been picked out before the proposal assessment. As a result, social 
workers often gossip about ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ agencies in the field, and scholars and 
municipal officials are concerned about the high risk of corruption in the purchase-of-services 
(Gong and Zhou, 2014). This collusive behaviour between social organisations and district 
governments has been gradually put under control when the municipal government standardised 
assessment criteria in the second round bidding in 2015.  
The same conflict of interest also arises in the annual performance evaluation of social 
organisations. Local authorities in both cities are inexperienced in social service delivery as well 
as in performance evaluation. Without professional knowledge to evaluate programme 
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effectiveness, government officials outsource the annual assessment to third-party reviewers. In 
turn, without sufficient work in-house experiences, government officials could only slowly 
accumulate subject-matter expertise and analytical capacity.  The lack of analytical capacity also 
discourages to provide constructive feedback to social organisations for quality improvement. 
The performance monitoring systems that are in place mainly focus on normative requirements 
such as agency registration, social insurance compliance, and so on (Wen 2012). Service quality 
is merely measured through the most understandable numeric indicators such as effort input and 
service output.  
It should be noted that Shenzhen is considering a transition to the project-based model. In 
the consultation paper of “Measures on Government Purchase of Social Work Services”, 
published in July 2015, the municipal Civil Affairs Bureau proposed that purchase-of-services 
should be mainly based on service projects, and supplemented by posts purchasing (Shenzhen 
Civil Affairs Bureau, 2015). The main reason for this, according to the explanation provided by 
government officials, is to cope with the bureaucratisation of social work and to maintain stable 
social work manpower (Southern Metropolis Daily 4 November 2014). Meanwhile, social 
organisations will no longer function as a labour dispatch agency: they will have more autonomy 
and flexibility to develop their own service programs, agency images and brandings (Southern 
Daily 28 January 2013). It is widely believed that, after a decade of expansion, social work and 
social service should now begin to pursue quality enhancement rather than quantity growth.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The adoption of purchase-of-services in China signals an ongoing paradigm shift in social 
development model, and a movement towards developmental welfare state, which would 
promote social equity and economic growth at the same time (Gilbert, 2005; Gu, 2010; Leung 
and Xu, 2015; Ngok, 2009). The article analyses the match of national policy intentions and two 
typical designs of purchase-of-services at the municipal level in China. Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen adopt a similar tool of purchase-of-services but in different settings to serve the same 
intents of government transformation and harmonious society building. The differences in policy 
capacity, such as individual knowledge about social work, availability of social organisations, 
and political trust in non-state actors, shape the different settings. Meanwhile, while the similar 
treasure-based purchase-of-services tool helps to generate significant growth in the numbers of 
social workers, social organisations and social services, both cities encounter several problems in 
policy implementation, including bureaucratisation of social work, high turnover rates in the 
social work profession, and non-accountable evaluation in contract awards and performance 
review. The bottleneck in Shenzhen’s post-based model is more serious than Guangzhou’s 
project-based model, as Shenzhen lacks Guangzhou’s knowledge and organisational resources 
and has created a hybrid mode of market and hierarchy.  
This case study analyses local experiment-based social policy design and policy learning 
that have occurred without conscious coordination by the central government. It goes beyond a 
discussion of markets and collaborative governance (Howlett, 2014), and contributes to the 
discussion of design thinking in China’s policymaking and local development models (Heilmann, 
2008; Mei and Liu, 2014; Shen and Tsai, 2016; Wang, 2009) and intention-capacity analytic 
framework  in “new policy design” studies (Howlett, 2014; Howlett M, Ramesh M. 2014; 
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Howlett, Mukherjee and Woo, 2015), and suggests implications for a broader discussion of the 
relationship between social organisations and the emerging welfare state, and to the larger debate 
on governance transformation in China from good management to welfare democracy.  
Unlike urban housing reform, the policy sector of social services is highly decentralised 
(Mei and Liu, 2014; Shue and Wong, 2007). The central government intends to take advantage 
of fiscal capacity to promote social organisations as well as the social work profession and social 
services. Grand national-level policy intentions have laid the groundwork for policy learning and 
experiments at the local level.  
Without conscious coordination by the central government, local governments have the 
latitude to implement their own policy designs. Guangzhou and Shenzhen draw lessons from 
Hong Kong’s welfare subvention system, and carry out project-based and post-based purchases 
respectively. Besides of fiscal resources, analytical, managerial and political capacity at 
individual, organisational and systemic levels have impacts on the design thinking and mix of 
instruments and settings (Howlett and Ramesh, 2015; Mukherjee and Howlett, 2016).  
On the policy learning stage, both municipal governments conceptualise Hong Kong’s 
“publicly subsidised services” as “government purchase of social services”. In fact, their 
purchase-of-services models have a higher level of marketisation and competition than that of 
Hong Kong’s recurrent subvention system. The Chinese government has not specifically 
differentiated “purchase-of-services” from “subsidised services” in the policy learning process 
(Jia and Su, 2009). The Hong Kong government actually subsidies much more welfare services 
than it purchases (Wen and Chong, 2014). For example, in 2015-16, Hong Kong’s recurrent 
subvention amount totalled HK$13,044.6 million. In addition to these subventions, the 
government earmarks HK$1,906.5 million to purchase welfare services, mainly community care 
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and residential care for the elderly, from private and NGO sectors (Social Welfare Department, 
2016). Therefore, the policy learning activity was partially informed: public officials do not have 
adequate knowledge of policy substance, and are also reluctant to take on greater financing 
responsibilities. Variation in social policy design conditioned by capacity and intentions is not a 
unique case in China’s local governance. Similar impacts of capacity and motivation on 
economic adaption have also been observed in recent comparative development study (Shen and 
Tsai, 2016). 
Shenzhen municipal government’s apparent shift away from the post-based model to the 
project-based model at the end of 2015 suggests the acknowledgement of poor design of the mix 
of market and hierarchical governance: setting up social work posts within public entities 
successfully promotes the social work occupation in the short term, but is not capable of 
cultivating the social work professional. This policy adjustment suggests that the local 
government, with its soaring fiscal capacity but a weak organisational foundation, is too 
absorbed in increasing the numbers of social organisations and social workers to notice the side 
effects of contracting out. However, policy change to the project-based model may not be a 
comprehensive solution for the problems such as bureaucratisation of social work and collusive 
behaviour, as similar problems are observed in Guangzhou as well. 
Despite the concerns with quality, Guangzhou and Shenzhen experiments are considered to 
be a successful advancement of harmonious society building in terms of increasing numbers of 
social organisations and social workers. The achievements of these two metropolises in 
Guangdong province have been praised by the Minister of Civil Affairs as Guangdong 
Experience (China Philanthropy Times, 2 April 2013, cited from Leung and Xu, 2015). Even 
before purchase-of-services was formalised as a national welfare approach in 2013, the project- 
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and post-based models had begun to be more broadly learned and adopted by various municipal 
governments. The take-up of Guangdong’s project- and post-based models highlights the 
importance of temporal designs of policy experiments, especially in a social policy sector 
without central coordination (Mei and Liu, 2014; Howlett, Mukherjee and Woo, 2015). 
On the other hand, several adjustments in Guangzhou and Shenzhen imply crucial progress 
of capacity enhancement. For example, enhanced transparency in the selection process in 
Guangzhou and social work manpower strategic planning suggest managerial competences 
improvement in the governance system. Meanwhile, standardised bidding and performance 
assessment systems also show the municipal government’s organisational political capacity to 
coordinate inter-organisational interests.  
Though the state has reinforced the service provision functions, it still perceives a liberal 
undertone of social organisation and the social work profession as a potential threat to the party-
state (Gao and Yan, 2015; Leung et al., 2012). Contracting out, or “purchase-of-services”, is 
more like a social engineering project in China. Through it, the state is developing “a new 
governmentality for penetrating into societal life and absorbing the society” (Xiang, 2010: 118), 
rather than developing political capacity for negotiating with social advocacy organisations and 
building liberal social work practices. The latest evidence is the General Office of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China’s (2015) publication of “Opinions on Enhancing 
Party-building within Social Organisations”. In this case, current designs of contracting out is 
still embedded into the traditional socialist totalitarianism (Chan, 2005; Guo, 2000; Tsou, 1994). 
The dual policy intentions of contracting out—government transformation and harmonious 
society building—have only been partially completed.  
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